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4.1.2014

Markus Gabriel

Realism and Materialism

Symposium Speculations on Anonymous Materials
11:00FridericianumFriedrichsplatz 1834117 Kassel
 
The standard assumption of traditional realism was that to be a realist is to believe in the representation-independent existence of a particular kind of object, most prominently, the kind of object individuated regardless of our individuating activities. This motivated traditional materialism. I will argue that both traditional realism and traditional materialism are in principle false positions. Against these traditional views I will defend new realism, that is, a position according to which "the real", among other things, consists of indefinitely many descriptions of and by itself. I will contrast this with materialism and introduce an interesting and widely neglected argument from Husserl according to which there are no objects as such or tout court. Yet, this does not at all amount to correlationism or anti-realism, as many contemporary philosophers believe, but rather to a non-reductive realism in all departments. I will conclude by suggesting that there is a coherent form of materialism, one that acknowledges the existence of intelligible matter.